Handling Environmental Cleanup Costs by Harl, Neil E.
Volume 5 | Number 15 Article 1
8-5-1994
Handling Environmental Cleanup Costs
Neil E. Harl
Iowa State University, harl@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harl, Neil E. (1994) "Handling Environmental Cleanup Costs," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 5 : No. 15 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol5/iss15/1
 Agricultural Law Digest
An Agricultural Law Press Publication Volume 5, No. 15 August 5, 1994
Editor: Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. Contributing Editor Dr. Neil E. Harl, Esq. ISSN 1051-2780
Agricultural Law Digest is published by the Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI 53705, bimonthly except June and December.  Annual
subscription $100.  Copyright 1994 by  Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. and Neil E. Harl.  No part of this newsletter may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing
from the publisher.  Printed on recycled paper by Accurate Business Service, Madison, WI.
113
HANDLING ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS
— by Neil E. Harl*
 For several years, it was generally believed that
environmental cleanup expenses were deductible for
income tax purposes as an ordinary and necessary business
expense.1 However, the issuance of three private letter
rulings beginning in 1992 indicated that the Internal
Revenue Service view was that such expenditures should be
capitalized and amortized over some time period.2 Now,
IRS has shifted its position in response to widespread
criticism of the position taken in the private letter rulings
and is willing to accept current deductibility of some
environmental cleanup costs.3
Private rulings
The position taken by IRS in the private letter rulings
issued in 1992-1993 was that costs incurred as part of a
general rehabilitation of property with respect to
environmental contamination were not deductible but
instead had to be amortized over some unspecified time
period.4 The first of the three rulings involved the costs of
removing and replacing asbestos insulation.5 The second
ruling, with similar reasoning, focused on the costs of PCB
cleanup.6 That ruling, interestingly enough, allowed current
deductibility for the legal fees involved.7 The third ruling
also related to asbestos and involved the costs of removing
asbestos from a building converted to a garage and office
space.8 The ruling recites that the costs were depreciable
over 31.5 years under the straight line method.9 That period
(31.5 years) was then the time for depreciating
nonresidential real property.1 0  Only straight line
depreciation is allowed for that class of property.11 The
same ruling allowed a deduction for the cost of
encapsulating exposed and damaged asbestos-containing
pipe insulation in a warehouse as an ordinary and necessary
business expense.12
Rev. Rul. 94-38
In its latest pronouncement on the issue, the Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that costs incurred to clean up
land and to treat groundwater that had been contaminated
by a business could be deducted as an ordinary and
necessary
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business expense.13 In the ruling, soil remediation activities
included excavating the contaminated soil, transporting the
soil to a waste disposal facility and backfilling with
uncontaminated soil.14 The same ruling held that the costs
attributable to groundwater treatment facilities (wells, pipes,
pumps and other equipment to extract, treat and monitor
contaminated groundwater) were capital expenditures.15
Under the facts of Rev. Rul. 94-38,16 a corporation
owned and operated a manufacturing plant the corporation
had built on land acquired in 1970. At the time of purchase,
the land apparently was not contaminated. The land became
contaminated from hazardous waste (from manufacturing
operations) that was buried on the tract of land. To comply
with current environmental requirements, the corporation
undertook a project to remediate the soil that had become
contaminated. The corporation also decided to install a
system of monitoring of the groundwater to ensure that all
hazardous waste had been removed.
The ruling recites that the effect of the cleanup will be to
restore the corporation's land to the same physical condition
existing before the contamination occurred.
The ruling states that in determining whether current
deduction or capitalization is the appropriate tax treatment
for any particular expenditure, it is important to consider the
extent to which the expenditure will produce “significant
future benefits."17 IRS concluded that the soil cleanup
expenditures and the ongoing groundwater treatment
expenditures did not produce permanent improvements to
the corporation's land. The corporation was merely restoring
its soil and groundwater to their condition before
contamination by manufacturing operations.
With respect to the groundwater treatment facilities, the
ruling points out that the facilities have a useful life
substantially beyond the tax year in which the facilities
were constructed.18 Those capitalized costs would be
recoverable "under applicable law," presumably by
depreciation.
Possible legislation
Although Rev. Rul. 94-3819 goes a long way toward
clarifying the issue of environmental cleanup costs,
Congress is working on legislation that would provide
additional statutory guidance in the area.20
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
ADVERSE USE. The plaintiff’s land was separated
from the defendant’s land by a road but the plaintiff’s land
actually extended several feet onto the defendant’s side of
the road. The defendant had built a driveway across the
disputed land to the road, maintained a shed on the disputed
land, and grew crops on the disputed land as close as
possible to the road. The plaintiff argued that the
defendant’s use of the land was permissive; therefore, no
adverse possession could occur. The court held that
permission was not supported by the evidence because the
plaintiffs never objected to the defendant’s predecessors in
title use of the disputed land and the plaintiff had asked the
defendant for permission to use the shed on the disputed
land. The court held that the defendant's construction of the
driveway, mowing and growing of crops were sufficient use
of the disputed land to support acquisition of the land by
adverse possession. Sierens v. Frankenreider, 632 N.E.2d
1055 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994).
The plaintiff had cleared timber from the defendant’s
property and filed suit to quiet title by adverse possession to
the area where the trees were cut. The plaintiff claimed to
have built a fence around the area, cleared the area, built a
shed on the property, maintained a garden and constructed a
pond. Expert witnesses, however, testified that aerial
photographs did not indicate any activity on the disputed
land until the timber cutting operation began. The court held
that the trial court’s decision for the defendant was
supported by the evidence. In addition, the trial court’s
failure to award damages for the cut trees was also upheld
because the defendant failed to show how many trees were
cut. Phillips v. Fisher, 634 So.2d 1305 (La. Ct. App.
1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtors operated a dairy farm and
filed for Chapter 7. The debtors had leased cows and calves
from the creditor and had entered into a purchase contract
for cows and calves in which the creditor retained a security
interest until the contract payments were made. The
debtor/husband sold most of the leased and contract animals
without the permission of the creditor and without remitting
the proceeds to the creditor or making the lease or contract
payments. The debtor/wife did not participate in the sale of
the animals but was found to have participated in the dairy
as a partner with the debtor/husband. The court held that the
debtor/husband’s sale of the leased and contract animals
was a willful and malicious injury of the creditor's rights in
the property; therefore, the creditor’s claim for the rent and
contract price was nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(6). The claim was also held nondischargeable as to
the debtor/wife because the wife was a partner in the
business. In re Bullington, 167 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
CATTLE. The debtor dairy farmer claimed three bulls as
exempt tools of the trade under Vt. Stat. § 2740(2). In
denying the exemption, the Bankruptcy Court distinguished
the Vermont exemption as much narrower than the
exemption statutes involved in the cases which allowed such
an exemption. The court also noted that an exemption for
cattle was otherwise provided; thus, indicating that cattle
were not intended by the legislature to be exempt as tools of
the trade. The appellate court reversed, citing precedent
from other circuits that farm animals can qualify as tools of
the trade for farmers. The appellate court noted that other
tools of the trade were also eligible for other specific
exemptions, e.g., trucks were tools of a trade and eligible for
the motor vehicle exemption. The court also noted that the
value limitation on exempt tools of a trade would prevent
abuse by debtors and limit the detrimental effect on
creditors. In re Parrotte, 22 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 1994), rev’g
unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g , 143 B.R. 622 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1992).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor claimed an exemption
for the proceeds of a life insurance policy in an access
account established on the pre-petition death of the debtor’s
spouse. The trustee argued that the exemption was available
only as to unmatured policies and that once the proceeds
were paid, the money no longer qualified as an insurance
policy. The court held that the exemption covered the
proceeds of the insurance policy access account established
